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THE U.S. SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS 
ACTION: AN UNLIKELY EXPORT TO THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
Manning Gilbert Warren III * 
INTRODUCTION 
his Article addresses the issue of whether the securities litigation 
model in the United States, centered on the notorious securities 
fraud class action, has been or should be exported throughout the world 
in order to provide defrauded investors greater access to justice. Specifi-
cally, the focus of this Article is whether the U.S. securities class action 
has spread or is likely to spread to the individual member states of the 
European Union (“EU”), or, alternatively, whether it may evolve into a 
supranational remedy through EU legislation. Although the EU has 
achieved an astounding degree of harmonization in the securities laws of 
its member states,1 it has not yet advanced any individual or collective 
private remedies for violations of those securities laws. Moreover, while 
a number of the EU’s member states have adopted collective redress pro-
cedures in other areas, none have advanced a U.S.-style class action pri-
vate remedy for securities fraud. 
The failure by the EU and its various member states to enact U.S.-style 
class action and other collective private remedies for investors in securi-
ties may be readily explained by the differences in both the structure and 
demographics of European securities markets. The retail markets for se-
curities among the EU member states are relatively underdeveloped 
compared to U.S. securities markets, particularly in terms of substantive 
participation by individual investors.2 Consequently, there has hardly 
                                                                                                             
* H. Edward Harter, Chair of Commercial Law, Brandeis School of Law, University of 
Louisville. The author would like to thank Lawrence A. Sucharow, Labaton Sucharow 
LLP, his colleague on the securities litigation panel of Brooklyn Law School’s Globaliza-
tion of the U.S. Litigation Model Symposium, for his thoughtful review and comments. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by his research assistant, 
Taylor Gerlach, and by his administrative assistant, Janet G. Sullivan, in the final prepa-
ration of this Article. 
 1. See generally MANNING GILBERT WARREN III, Global Harmonization of Securi-
ties Laws: The Achievements of the European Communities, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES 
REGULATION 23 (2003). 
 2. Unlike stock ownership levels in the United States, Elina Laakso’s summary of 
data gathered by the SHARE project for the year of 2006 to 2007 shows the percentage of 
Europeans directly investing in European stock markets to be quite low. See Elina 
Laakso, Stock Market Participation and Household Characteristics in Europe 32 (Aug. 9, 
2010) (unpublished master’s thesis) (on file with the Aalto University School of Econom-
ics); Brian K. Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell, Traci L. Mach & Kevin B. Moore, Changes 
T
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been a populist hue and cry for more effective private remedies for secu-
rities fraud, and much less for broad-based collective redress procedures. 
Indeed, it is at least questionable whether there is any necessity for de-
velopment of an EU-wide securities class action or stronger collective 
remedies among the member states. Nevertheless, the EU’s European 
Commission recently invigorated the class action debate in Europe by 
initiating a public consultation process to discuss generally the utility of 
class actions and other forms of collective redress, both at the EU and 
member state regulatory levels.3 In doing so, the Commission made it 
clear that the U.S. class action remedy is the model of what not to do.4 
This Article will first focus on the U.S. class action remedy as a 
wounded horse, hardly the robust steed the U.S. would offer as a breed to 
emulate in Europe. Domestically, the class action has been endlessly po-
litically derided since the early 1990s, and, although still on four legs, 
has faced considerable hostility in legislative and judicial fora.5 After 
these observations, the author will briefly examine the significant barri-
ers to entry, as well as the general hostility, that the class action con-
fronts in the European legal culture, despite a few recent and significant 
inroads. While U.S. class actions have been facilitated both by principles 
common to the U.S. litigation system and specific to the class action, EU 
                                                                                                             
in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances, 95 FED. RES. BULL. A1 (2009) [hereinafter Bucks et al., Changes in U.S. Family 
Finances]. In only four countries did stock ownership by individuals exceed 25% (52% in 
Sweden, 47% Denmark, 31% Switzerland (approximately), and 29% Belgium (approxi-
mately)). Laakso, supra. While most countries had rates of ownership around 10%, stock 
ownership among households was the lowest in Italy, Greece, Spain, the Czech Republic, 
and Poland (7%, 6%, 6%, 4%, and 1%, respectively). Id. On the contrary, for the same 
year, 51.1% of U.S. households owned stocks directly or through investment funds. 
Bucks et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances, supra, at A1, A27. Furthermore, a 2008 
FESE report shines light on the largely institutional makeup of European exchanges and 
share-ownership structures, with institutions (private financial and non-financial enter-
prises and companies) accounting for more than triple the 14% of the total market value 
of listed shares owned by individuals. FED’N OF EUR. SEC. EXCH. [FESE], ECON. & 
STATISTICS COMM. [ESC], SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN EUROPE 11 (2008), available 
at 
http://www.bourse.lu/contenu/docs/commun/societe/Actualites/2008/FESE_SHARE_O
WNERSHIP_SURVEY_2007.pdf. Consequently, the lacking participation of individuals 
in the European share ownership structure suggests that a private remedy such as the 
securities class action might not even be truly needed. 
 3. See generally Commission Staff Working Document, Public Consultation: To-
wards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, SEC (2011) 173 final (Feb. 
4, 2011) [hereinafter Towards a Coherent European Approach], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0054/sec_2011_173_en.pdf. 
 4. Id.; see infra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. 
 5. See generally infra notes 12–23. 
2012] U.S. SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTION 1077 
collective redress schemes have been debilitated by negative corollary 
principles. These principles are common both to the litigation systems of 
the member states and specific to their various collective redress proce-
dures. Following this discussion, the Article will briefly review the Eu-
ropean Commission’s consultation process addressing the larger issue of 
collective redress in the European Union. Finally, this article will con-
clude that aside from episodic grand results for entrepreneurial U.S. 
plaintiff lawyers pursuing collective relief in the Netherlands, the U.S.-
style securities fraud class action is unlikely to become a viable mecha-
nism for providing European access to justice for defrauded investors. 
Neither an EU level directive for broad horizontal application nor a more 
limited secular application to securities fraud claims appears likely at the 
present time or in the foreseeable future. The EU member states simply 
have no zeal to partner private and public enforcement of their securities 
laws; the private Attorney General concept remains largely unique to 
American jurisprudence.6 Consequently, European investors should look 
to stronger and more vigorous public enforcement at the member state 
level through government funded and administered collective redress 
schemes for victims of securities fraud. 
II. THE U.S. SECURITIES CLASS ACTION: BLOODY BUT UNBOWED 
The U.S. securities fraud class action model has long been criticized as 
a failed remedy, a form of legal blackmail enabling plaintiffs’ lawyers to 
obtain large settlements from corporate defendants based on non-
meritorious claims.7 The purported primary beneficiary, at least in terms 
of monetary compensation, has been plaintiffs’ counsel, 8 which recovers 
a contingency fee ranging from roughly ten to thirty percent of the total 
class recovery.9 Although qualitative corporate governance reforms are 
often cosmetically tacked on to settlements in order to secure court ap-
proval, class action securities litigation has been accused of being a law-
yer-driven, entrepreneurial business that results in payouts not from “a 
securities fairy,” but from the movement of corporate funds “from inves-
tors’ right pocket to investors’ left pocket—and paying lawyers a lot for 
                                                                                                             
 6. See Ilana T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Global-
ized Economy—Permitting Foreign Claimants to be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in 
the U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563, 1566 n.11 (2005). 
 7. See generally Arthur A. Miller, Comment, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining 
Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979). 
 8. See Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey Miller, Essay, Will Aggregate Litigation 
Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 186 (2009). 
 9. See, e.g., id. 
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moving that money around.”10 As another prominent scholar has noted, 
“shareholders are suing shareholders,” and as a result, “diversified share-
holders wind up making pocket-shifting wealth transfers to them-
selves.”11 The debate over the policies served or disserved by securities 
class actions continues to rage, but both legislature and judicial devel-
opments evidence significant victories for the detractors. 
The viability of the securities class action has been considerably re-
duced by both judicial and legislative determinations during the past 
twenty-five years. In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court effectively cor-
ralled the vast bulk of securities litigation against dishonest broker-
dealers into industry-dominated arbitration proceedings.12 This decision 
reversed its own thirty-five year old holding that pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements were violative of the anti-waiver provisions of the federal 
securities laws.13 Then, in 2012, the Court effectively eliminated class 
action arbitration claims by upholding the enforceability of class action 
waivers in arbitration agreements.14 For those claims that may be given 
their day in court, the Supreme Court has imposed challenging “loss cau-
sation” requirements15 and has eliminated private aiding and abetting 
claims.16 Meanwhile, Congress in the 1990s effected a deregulatory tsu-
                                                                                                             
 10. Joseph Grundfest & Nicholas Varchaver, Winona, Martha & the Securities Fairy, 
FORTUNE (Aug. 11, 2003), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/08/11/346800/index.htm. 
 11. John C. Coffee, Jr., Capital Market Competitiveness and Securities Litigation, 
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 16, 2006, at 5. 
 12. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226, 232–35 (1987); Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479–84 (1989). 
 13. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 
U.S. 477 (1989). 
 14. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–52 (2011). The 
Court’s decision in Concepcion was presaged by its decision less than a year earlier in 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., holding that in the absence of 
affirmative indicia in the agreement, a party cannot be forced to arbitrate against a puta-
tive class. Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773–76 
(2010). See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005). 
 15. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343–46 (2005) (interpreting 
securities law statutes to demand that plaintiffs prove proximate causation and economic 
loss). 
 16. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164, 191 (1994); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 
158 (2008) (securities fraud plaintiffs may not sue “aiders and abettors” of fraud under a 
§ 10(b) claim unless the aiders and abettors own conduct separately satisfies the elements 
of a § 10(b) claim); see also Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. 
Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) (barring primary violation claims against an investment adviser 
who prepared misleading prospectuses for the mutual fund it controlled). 
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nami through a trilogy of statutory enactments largely designed to im-
pede plaintiffs’ attorneys in their pursuit of both federal and state reme-
dies for investors injured by securities law violations.17 Securities class 
actions were a primary target. Among the impediments imposed were 
heightened pleading requirements,18 discovery stays, restrictions on dam-
ages, and lead plaintiff and class counsel limitations.19 When plaintiffs’ 
class action counsel migrated to state courts, Congress slammed that 
door shut with the passage of preemptive legislation requiring removal of 
those actions to federal courts.20 Congress next enacted the Class Action 
Fairness Act21 to delimit plaintiff counsels’ choice of forum by expand-
ing federal diversity jurisdiction, mandating notices to federal and state 
authorities, and limiting attorney fee awards in class action coupon set-
tlements.22 Subsequently, and to the glee of the defense bar, the captains 
of the securities class action industry, Melvyn Weiss and Bill Lerach, 
were indicted and sent to prison for unlawful undisclosed payments to 
nominal plaintiffs in class actions that they filed over the years on behalf 
of investors.23 
                                                                                                             
 17. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (enacted to limit frivolous securi-
ties lawsuits by changing procedural standards; this included heightening of pleading 
standards, limiting the scope of pre-trial discovery and placing fee limitations on class 
attorneys); National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 
110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (preemptive 
overhaul of states’ securities acts to provide one uniform statutory act for companies and 
regulators to follow); Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 
77p (2006) [hereinafter SLUSA] (enacted to limit the amount of securities lawsuits being 
brought in state courts due to plaintiffs inability to meet the heightened pleading require-
ments of the Reform Act). For a general discussion of these statutes and especial criti-
cism of SLUSA, see Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor Protection: 
Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies for Securities Fraud, 60-SUM 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 169–84 (1997). 
 18. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323–24 (2007) (hold-
ing that under the Reform Act’s exacting pleading requirements, a plaintiff must plead 
facts rendering an inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing infer-
ence). 
 19. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 109 Stat. at 737. 
 20. SLUSA § 77p . 
 21. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 22. See generally Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593 (2008). 
 23. See Molly Selvin, Two-year sentence for Lerach, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2008), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lerach12feb12,0,3591784.story; Edvard Patterson, 
Weiss Sentenced to 2½ years for Kickback Scheme, BLOOMBERG (June 2, 2008, 4:38 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aGqfpC4ZjoAw. 
1080 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:3 
The Supreme Court recently delivered another devastating blow to 
plaintiffs’ securities counsel filing class actions in U.S. courts against 
foreign companies. Reaffirming a presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. securities laws, the Court, in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank Ltd.,24 held that the antifraud provisions applied only to 
domestic securities transactions and to transactions in securities listed on 
domestic exchanges in the United States.25 Justice Scalia effectively 
eradicated any fear that U.S. courts would continue as the “Shangri-La of 
class-action litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in 
foreign securities markets.”26 
Although the portent of securities class actions still strikes fear in the 
hearts of executives of publicly-held companies, the likelihood of suc-
cessful securities class actions against their companies is substantially 
less.27 The number of securities class action settlements approved in 
                                                                                                             
 24. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010). Two European 
countries filed amicus briefs in support of denying U.S. court jurisdiction over f-cubed 
claims: the United Kingdom and France. See Michael P. Murtagh, The Rule 23(b)(3) 
Superiority Requirement and Transnational Class Actions: Excluding Foreign Class 
Members in Favor of European Remedies, 34 HASTINGS INT’L COMP. L. REV. 1, 42 
(2011) stating that the premise for the briefs was a belief that jurisdiction would allow 
“U.S. courts [to] interfere with the policy choice they [foreign nations] have made in 
regulating securities.” 
 25. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878–82. Following the Court’s decision in Morrison, the 
U.S. Congress in its Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act man-
dated that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) conduct a study re-
garding whether private rights of action under the federal securities laws should be ap-
plied extraterritorially to cover transnational securities fraud. Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 929Y 
(2010). The SEC has commenced the study and has solicited public comments. See Study 
on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, No. 34-63174, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,822, 66,822 
(Oct. 25, 2010). 
 26. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878. One recent article has discussed whether Canada 
may be entitled to that distinction. See Tanya Monestier, Is Canada the New “Shangri 
La” of Global Securities Class Actions?, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 3 (forthcoming 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1929090. The author 
noted that “just as Ontario courts are opening their doors to global securities class ac-
tions, American courts seem to be closing theirs.” Id. at 2–3. 
 27. Modern class actions require the plaintiff class to meet many prerequisites before 
the case may advance to the merits. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) states four 
prerequisites that all classes must satisfy in order to receive class certification: (1) the 
class must be so numerous that joinder of the parties is impracticable (numerosity); (2) 
questions of law or fact common to the class must exist (commonality); (3) claims and 
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class 
(typicality); and (4) the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of the class (adequate representation). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Only once the judge 
determines that the class has satisfied all four prerequisites, can the class certification 
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2010 was the lowest in over ten years.28 Last year’s mid-term results 
demonstrate continuing weakness in the securities fraud class action 
business.29 Professor Joseph Grundfest, Director of the Stanford Law 
School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, recently concluded: 
There appears to be a sea change in the structure of the class action se-
curities fraud litigation business. The traditional claims that U.S.-based 
companies have been cooking their books or hyping their stocks are in 
sharp decline. . . . If one focuses exclusively on traditional fraud claims 
against U.S.-based companies, then 2011 may well be on track to be the 
quietest litigation year since Congress passed the Private Securities Lit-
igation Reform Act of 1995.30 
Notwithstanding the decline and despite serious abuses, the securities 
class action in the United States has enjoyed considerable success both as 
a deterrent to large-scale corporate securities fraud and as a source of 
compensatory recovery for investors.31 However, its success has devel-
                                                                                                             
analysis proceed to the other requirements set out in Rule 23. See Georgine v. Amchem 
Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 624 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). Once the requirements of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied, 
the class will be certified if it further satisfies any of the three types of class actions listed 
in Rule 23(b). See id. at 625. If the court finds that the class fulfills the Rule 23(b)(3) 
requirement that questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over solely 
individual claims, Rule 23(c)(2) allows absent class members to “opt-out” (exclude them-
selves from the class action). See Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement 
Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory 
Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 603 (2006); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). 
Should class members choose to exercise their right to opt-out of the class, the individual 
will not be bound by any settlement agreed to by the class and defendants. See Redish & 
Kastanek, supra. However, if a class member fails to opt-out, they will be bound by any 
settlement agreement reached between the class and defendants. See id. Thus, class 
members who do not affirmatively opt-out forgo the ability to bring a future action based 
on individual claims that the class has already collectively settled. See generally id. 
 28. STAN. LAW SCH. SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE & CORNERSTONE RES., 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW 14 (2011), available at 
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2010_YIR/Cornerstone_Research_F
ilings_2010_YIR.pdf. 
 29. Securities Class Action Filings Decrease Moderately in First Half of 2011, 
CORNERSTONE RES. (July 26, 2011), http://www.cornerstone.com/securities-filings-mid-
year-2011/. 
 30. Id. 
 31. At a recent informational program, Governance Reforms Through Securities 
Class Actions, sponsored by Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., experts stated that 
institutional investors view class action litigation as an effective means to achieve corpo-
rate reform. Che Odom, Securities Class Actions an Effective Way to Spur Governance 
Reforms, Experts Say, 26 CORP. COUNS. WEEKLY (BNA) 329 (Nov. 2, 2011), available at 
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oped in a uniquely adversarial legal system in a uniquely litigious cul-
ture. The primary features facilitating the U.S. securities class action are 
as follows: 
(1) its broad horizontal scope of application to virtually all causes of 
action, largely without sectoral limits; 
(2) liberal standing requirements, generally allowing any aggrieved 
member of a designated class to file a class action in a competent court; 
(3) the availability of contingency fees for legal services, often referred 
to as “no cure, no pay,” thus eliminating legal fees as barriers to plain-
tiffs; 
(4) freedom from the burden of the “loser pays” rule predominant in ju-
risdictions worldwide—in the United States, each party generally bears 
the responsibility for its own litigation costs, regardless of outcome; 
(5) liberal document and deposition discovery processes available to 
plaintiffs’ class counsel that can be massively intrusive, expensive, and 
time-consuming for corporate defendants; 
(6) trial by jury, employing jurors as finders of fact, despite jurors’ 
general lack of skill in financial disclosure issues and potential to bring 
populist or anti-corporate bias issues to bear on outcomes; 
(7) the opt-out feature,32 offering global peace for defendants by allow-
ing representation of all individuals and entities falling within a desig-
nated class of investors who do not expressly “opt-out” of the class—
those investors who take no action and simply let inertia take its course 
are included in the plaintiff class and thus subject to the preclusive ef-
fect of ultimate settlements and judgments; and, lastly, 
(8) the availability of punitive damages for claims ancillary to the fed-
eral securities fraud cause of action.33 
                                                                                                             
http://convergence.bna.com/ContentDelivery/ContentItem/Article/235278720000000186/
354478. 
 32. The “opt-out” feature of the U.S. class action presents a unique procedural co-
nundrum. Although commonly known as the “opt-out” feature because of the preclusive 
effects that bind class members to the judgment unless they “opt-out,” the procedure 
actually denies class members any portion of monetary relief unless they essentially “opt-
in.” This is typically done by filing an individual claim with the class’ claims administra-
tor. In essence, it is possible and many times very likely that a member of a U.S. plaintiff 
class will suffer the preclusive effects of a settlement agreement without ever receiving 
any proportion of the monetary settlement relief they would have been entitled to if they 
filed a claim. 
 33. See Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a 
Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 709–10 (2005); see also Towards a Coher-
ent European Approach, supra note 3, at 9, para. 21; John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the 
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Despite various legislative “reforms” over the years, this lethal combi-
nation of facilitative features continues to place experienced securities 
class action counsel in a favored position to advance both meritorious 
and non-meritorious claims to advantageous settlements. Notwithstand-
ing continual demands for reform from the securities industry and the 
defense bar based on perceived threats to the U.S. economy,34 the securi-
ties class action, even as a wounded horse, retains considerable vitality at 
home. Although it clearly has no “unconquerable soul,” it remains 
“bloody, but unbowed.”35 
III.   EUROPEAN UNION’S NATIONAL BARRIERS TO U.S. SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTIONS 
The European Union’s member states feature legal cultures which 
largely are abhorrent to the adversarial legal system and litigious culture 
of the United States. EU member states generally share a cultural aver-
sion to litigation and traditionally have favored government regulation 
and public enforcement over private lawsuits.36 Indeed, the EU’s aver-
                                                                                                             
Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1534, 1535–36 (2006); James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Vir-
tuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 497–99 (1997). 
 34. See, e.g., Robert Glauber, Section II: Regulatory Process, in LUIGI ZINGALES ET 
AL., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 59 (2006), 
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf. 
In its response to the European Commission’s recent public consultation on collective 
redress, infra notes 145–77 and accompanying text, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s 
Institute for Legal Reform advised the European Commission of a 2007 study concluding 
that the permissive rules of the United States’ liberal tort system resulted in annual costs 
of some $865 billion, constituting an annual “tort tax” of $9,827 on a family of four. 
Response from the U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform [LIR], to the Eur. Comm’n Pub-
lic Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress 2 (Apr. 
29, 2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/us_chamber_instit
ute_en.pdf. It also expressed its fears that efforts to reform collective redress schemes in 
the European Union might erode Europe’s traditional safeguards against abusive litiga-
tion which, in turn, “would result in an explosion of meritless, abusive litigation.” Id. 
 35. William Ernest Henley, Invictus (1875), reprinted in 8 LEATHERNECK 32 (1925). 
 36. Indeed, one writer has recently noted Europe’s “historical preference for a regula-
tory rather than a citizen driven litigious response to widespread wrongdoing,” a prefer-
ence that “remains strong despite recent developments in collective redress litigation.” 
Jessica Beess und Chrostin, The Future of Collective Redress in Europe: Where We Are 
and How to Move Forward 11 (Apr. 2011) (unpublished student paper), available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/hnmcp/files/2012/02/Fisher-Sander-Prize-2011-Winner-
Jessica-Beess-und-Chrostin-May-2011.pdf. Another has observed that “Europe has pre-
dominantly punished corporate misconduct with regulatory action, rather than through 
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sion to U.S.-style class actions “corresponds to sustained critiques of 
class actions in the United States.”37 
The EU’s member states generally have none of the facilitating fea-
tures credited for the nurture and development of the U.S. securities class 
action. EU member states generally prohibit plaintiffs’ lawyers from col-
lecting contingent fees.38 Losing parties in litigation are generally liable 
for the prevailing parties’ legal fees and costs.39 Parties to litigation do 
not have liberal access to each other’s relevant documents and testimo-
ny.40 Jury trials in civil cases are virtually nonexistent and punitive dam-
ages are never available.41 Moreover, even in those member states that do 
provide for some form of collective redress, they generally provide for 
class inclusion of only those individuals and entities that expressly opt-in 
to the proceedings, and thus do not preclude actions by claimants who do 
not.42 According to one scholar, “the law is unlikely to see anything like 
a trans-Atlantic convergence toward the specifics of U.S.-style class ac-
tions,”43 and therefore, only a highly unlikely legal and cultural meta-
morphosis could transform the European Union into a receptive envi-
ronment for U.S.-style securities class actions.44 A closer look at these 
characteristics of the legal scheme of the EU demonstrates why such a 
structure might be viewed as debilitative to any effort to replicate the 
U.S.-style class action. 
                                                                                                             
private enforcement.” Tiana L. Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 
28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 141, 142 (2010). 
 37. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 8, at 180. 
 38. Mark A. Behrens, Gregory L. Fowler & Silvia Kim, Global Litigation Trends—
Class Actions, Contingency Fees, and Punitive Damages: Moving Toward the American 
Civil Law Model?, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 165, 166 n.1 (2009) (citing Sabine Chalmers, 
US Style Litigation in Europe?, 26 ACC Docket 16 (Apr. 2008). 
 39. Id. at 168 n.6 (citing Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An 
Overview, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 2009, at 7, 22). 
 40. Id. at 167, 167 n.3 (citing Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the 
Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009)); Lau-
rel Harbour & Marc Shelley, Expanding Multi-party Litigation to a Shrinking World, in 
2006 ABA ANNUAL MEETING, SECTION OF LITIGATION, THE EMERGING EUROPEAN CLASS 
ACTION 1, 1 (Aug. 3, 2006), available at 
http://el.shb.com/nl_images/SHBWebsite/PracticeAreas/International/Pubs/The%20Emer
ging%20European%20Class%20Action_ABA_Meeting.pdf. 
 41. Behrens et al., supra note 38, at 187. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Nagareda, supra note 40, at 6. 
 44. See supra note 2. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Own-
ership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 
YALE L.J. 1 (2001). 
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(1) No Contingency Fees 
Contingency fees, which fuel the class action remedy in the United 
States, have been largely rejected by EU member states.45 Fees based on 
a proportion of the sum recovered, pactum de quota litis, are prohibited 
in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, Belgium, Cy-
prus, Malta, Czech Republic, Denmark, Luxembourg, Greece, Ireland, 
Poland, Romania, and the United Kingdom.46 Some member states do 
permit conditional or success fees, payable only upon a successful con-
clusion of the litigation. Such fees may include an uplift over normal 
rates but cannot include a proportion of the recovered damages.47 The 
prohibition of contingency fees not only serves to restrain aggrieved in-
vestors financially unable to pursue costly litigation, it also likely serves 
as a major restraint on the entrepreneurial zeal of the plaintiffs’ bar. 
(2) Loser Pays 
The “loser pays” or the “English rule” requires the losing party in liti-
gation to pay the winning party’s costs.48 It has been adopted by every 
EU member state except the Principality of Luxembourg.49 It is based on 
a durable and culturally consistent policy of imposing financial risks on 
would-be complainants in order to discourage unnecessary litigation.50 
Thus, European lawyers are forced to analyze diligently the reasonable 
prospects for a successful claim and the reasonable quantum of damages 
to be sought through litigation. By placing the onus of both sides’ costs 
on the party bringing the litigation, only clearly meritorious claims are 
                                                                                                             
 45. Behrens et al., supra note 38, at 183–87. 
 46. See Christopher Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer & Magdalena Tulibacka, Costs and 
Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study 29 (Univ. of Oxford Legal Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 55, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1511714. 
 47. Id.; see also Eur. Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies, Overview 
of Existing Collective Redress Schemes in EU Member States 19, 23, 26–28, Comm. on 
Internal Mkt. & Consumer Prot., Doc. IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-16 (July 2011) (by Mariusz 
Maciejewski) [hereinafter EU Overview], available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201107/20110715ATT24242/20
110715ATT24242EN.pdf. 
 48. See Shelley Thompson, The Globalization of Securities Markets: Effects on Inves-
tor Protection, 41 INT’L LAW. 1121 (2007); see also Marie Gryphon, Assessing the Ef-
fects of a “Loser Pays” Rule on the American Legal System, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 567 (2011). 
 49. See Stefano Grace, Strengthening Investor Confidence in Europe: U.S–Style Se-
curities Class Actions and the Acquis Communautaire, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 281, 
289 (2006). 
 50. See Gryphon, supra note 48, at 567–69; Thompson, supra note 48, at 1143. 
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likely to be prosecuted by plaintiffs and their counsel. While the loser 
pays rule seriously discourages access to the courts, it avoids the costli-
ness and lack of settlements among weak claims in the U.S. system. The 
loser pays rule continues to be “a substantial deterrent to private investor 
enforcement measures in Europe.”51 
(3) Discovery Limitations 
In stark contrast to the liberal discovery procedures for document pro-
duction and deposition testimony available in U.S. litigation, discovery is 
largely unavailable to the parties in judicial proceedings in the EU mem-
ber states. EU states mostly subscribe to the civil law tradition that the 
gathering of evidence is strictly a judicial function.52 There is virtually no 
documentary discovery and no deposition discovery in the vast majority 
of EU jurisdictions, and only limited document discovery in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland.53 Discovery in the United Kingdom has been de-
scribed as a “push” rather than a “pull” system, commanding lawyers, as 
officers of the court, to provide to the adverse party all documents that 
support either party’s position.54 In other words, the disclosure process is 
not dependent on requests and responses.55 In the continental EU mem-
ber states, litigation is administered by the presiding judge without any 
discovery process driven by the parties’ counsel.56 The liberal discovery 
procedures integral to U.S. litigation are simply alien to litigation in Eu-
rope. 
(4) No Jury Trials 
In continental Europe, no member state provides for a jury trial in civil 
cases.57 It is rarely used in Scotland and is available in England only for 
very limited categories of civil cases.58 Consequently, the success or fail-
                                                                                                             
 51. Grace, supra note 49, at 290. 
 52. See Harbour & Shelley, supra note 40, at 1. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Nigel Murray, Discovery from the European Perspective, ABA LAW PRACTICE 
TODAY (Oct. 2008), http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/mgt10081.shtml. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. The discovery process is further circumscribed by the EU Data Privacy Di-
rective, which extends individual privacy protection to data on employer-provided com-
puters, thereby according individual privacy the status of a basic human right. See Coun-
cil Directive 95/46, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 8 (EC). 
 57. Danielle Kantor, Note, The Limits of Federal Jurisdiction and the F-Cubed Case: 
Adjudicating Transnational Securities Disputes in Federal Courts, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 839, 855, 855 n.79 (2010). 
 58. See John Sheldon & Peter Murray, Rethinking Rules of Evaluating Admissibility 
in Non-jury Trials, 86 JUDICATIVE 227, 228 n.3 (Mar.–Apr. 2003). 
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ure of litigated claims is placed in the hands of non-elected jurists, gen-
erally experienced and well-trained in the judicial determination of both 
the facts and the law in various legal proceedings.59 The elimination of 
fact finding by individual jurors with limited understanding of securities 
issues and possible biases favoring loss-suffering investors forecloses the 
plaintiff lawyers’ appeals to jury sympathies and biases, along with their 
willingness to roll the dice on questionable or non-meritorious claims. 
(5) No Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages generally are not awarded by courts in the EU mem-
ber states, and, accordingly, it is largely impossible to secure punitive 
damages awards against business enterprises in the EU member states.60 
This rejection of punitive damages is premised largely on the underlying 
policy that civil lawsuits should permit compensatory recoveries, with 
punishment to be meted out solely by the criminal justice system.61 Out-
sized jury awards of punitive damages in U.S. litigation are universally 
disfavored in the EU and most jurisdictions worldwide.62 
These five debilitative factors generally applicable to private civil ac-
tions brought in the EU’s member states are sufficient in themselves to 
discourage even the least risk-adverse plaintiffs’ securities lawyers from 
pursuing bona fide claims on behalf of aggrieved investors in the EU’s 
member states. These barriers are considerably heightened for those law-
yers considering claims through a collective class action mechanism. The 
following discussion of the general characteristics of the extant collective 
redress schemes in the EU’s member states reveals three additional debil-
itative factors that complete the negation of the corollary principles that 
have nurtured U.S.-style securities class actions. 
IV. COLLECTIVE REDRESS AMONG THE EU MEMBER STATES 
Among EU member states, there has been no fundamental shift from 
public enforcement to private enforcement of the member states’ securi-
ties laws. As previously discussed, the same factors that facilitate class 
actions in the United States actually deter similar proceedings in the EU 
                                                                                                             
 59. See, e.g., Harbour & Shelley, supra note 40, at 1, 7, 13. 
 60. See Adam Liptak, Embraced by U.S., Punitive Damages Scorned Elsewhere: 
Many Nations See Practice as Usurping Justice System’s Role, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 
26, 2008, at 4. 
 61. See generally John Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 396–97 nn.24–27 (2004). 
 62. Id. at 393–94. 
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member states. Consequently, no European member state has yet enacted 
a U.S.-style securities class action for defrauded investors. 
According to a recent EU report, sixteen member states have enacted 
collective redress schemes, providing “a complex legal patchwork of 
solutions,” but the report concludes that these schemes are “not effective 
due to disparities and low participation rates.”63 Collective redress, as 
defined by the report, encompasses “any mechanism that may accom-
plish the cessation or prevention of unlawful business practices which 
affect a multitude of claimants or the compensation for the harm caused 
by such practices,” and that provides either for injunctive or compensato-
ry relief.64 These schemes all “stop markedly short of full-fledged em-
brace of U.S.-style class actions.”65 
The collective redress schemes adopted by these member states bear 
little resemblance to each other and are remotely different from the U.S.-
style class action.  Most of these schemes are subject to opt-in require-
ments, denying preclusive effect against potential claimants who have 
not consented to inclusion in a given class.66 Many are limited by sec-
toral scope to consumer protection, product liability, or antitrust viola-
tions, while others have a broader, horizontal scope of coverage.67 They 
also have widely-varying standing requirements. Some vest only public 
authorities with power to bring collective proceedings, some grant stand-
ing only to non-profit foundations and consumer organizations, and oth-
ers permit harmed individuals and entities to use the procedures.68 In dif-
ferent words, the collective redress schemes thus far enacted by the 
member states are subject not only to the (above) five common debilitat-
ing factors generally applicable to civil actions in the EU’s member 
states, but are also subject to the following three specific debilitating fac-
tors, thus completing the negation of the eight previously identified facil-
itating factors that have long developed and nurtured the U.S. class ac-
tion. 
(1) Limited Scope of Application 
Most of the collective redress schemes adopted by the EU’s member 
states are limited in applicability to certain sectors of the law and, ac-
                                                                                                             
 63. EU Overview, supra note 47, at 5. 
 64. Id. at 6. 
 65. Nagareda, supra note 40, at 6. 
 66. See EU Overview, supra note 47, at 40; see also Jules Stuyck, Class Actions in 
Europe? To Opt-In or to Opt-Out, That is the Question, 20 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 483–505 
(2009). 
 67. See, e.g., EU Overview, supra note 47, at 11. 
 68. Id. 
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cordingly, are not necessarily available for violations of a particular 
member state’s securities laws.69 While some collective redress schemes 
are horizontal and thus have broad scopes of application,70 many are lim-
ited sectorially to consumer protection claims,71 product liability claims, 
antitrust claims,72 or some combination of these limited areas of applica-
tion.73 Consequently, claims made on behalf of a specified group of 
claimants for securities law violations may have no collective redress 
scheme available to them, and as a result would be limited only to any 
individual causes of action available to them under a given member 
state’s applicable law.74 
(2) Restrictive Standing Requirements 
The collective redress schemes adopted by various EU member states 
generally provide standing only to governmental authorities,75 consumer 
associations,76 and other specified organizations.77 Individuals, despite 
their extent of injury as a result of alleged violations, may be able to 
bring individual actions but are not necessarily entitled to bring a repre-
sentative action on behalf of a specified class. 
(3) Opt-in Requirements 
The majority of collective redress schemes in the EU provide for an 
opt-in procedure, thus requiring all claimants to be identified individual-
ly, either at the time the action is filed under some statutes or at later 
                                                                                                             
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. at 39. 
 71. Finland, for example, has enacted a collective redress mechanism that is limited 
to consumer disputes. Id. at 19. 
 72. For example, Hungary provides only for group actions under its antitrust laws. Id. 
at 25. 
 73. Portugal’s scheme is applicable to violations related to consumer protection, pub-
lic health, quality of life and preservation of the cultural and environmental heritage. Id. 
at 32. 
 74. Id. at 39–40. 
 75. For example, in Finland only the Finnish Consumer Ombudsman may file collec-
tive redress claims, with no secondary rights of action for members of the specified group 
of consumers. Id. at 19. Similarly, only the Hungarian Competition authority has standing 
to assert collective claims under a collective redress scheme limited to antitrust viola-
tions. Id. at 25. 
 76. For example, under Greece’s collective redress procedures, limited in scope of 
application to consumer protection claims, only consumer associations having at least 
500 active members and registered for at least one year before filing any action, have 
standing to file group actions. Id. at 24. 
 77. For example, Portugal extends standing to any “associations or foundations that 
promote certain general interests.” Id. at 32. 
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stages of the proceedings under other statutes.78 Any settlement negotiat-
ed or judgment rendered by a competent court will only bind those 
claimants who have expressly consented to the proceedings.79 The de-
fendant remains subject to all claims that may be brought by injured par-
ties who have not opted-in, and, consequently, the defendant cannot 
achieve any national or global peace through settlement with the repre-
sentative of the designated class.80 These commonly applicable opt-in 
requirements generally prevent the global preclusive effect that incentiv-
izes settlements by defendants in U.S.-style class actions. Given the wide 
range of disparities among the EU member states’ collective redress 
schemes, most of which were adopted during the last ten years, and given 
the barriers posed by the common and specific debilitating factors ac-
companying them, it is easy to understand why they have not been effec-
tive. 
V. THE NETHERLANDS COLLECTIVE REDRESS SCHEMES 
The collective redress procedures in the Netherlands have been fre-
quently praised as the most effective of the member states’ collective 
redress schemes, largely due to more frequent use by consumers.81 In 
fact, two significant collective redress mechanisms have been adopted in 
the Netherlands. The first is a representative group action that can only 
be used for injunctive or declaratory relief and not for monetary damag-
es.82 The second, the collective settlement mass claims action, wet col-
lectieve afwikkeling massaschade, popularly known as “WCAM,” is not 
a class action at all, but a settlement approval procedure providing for 
judicial approval of out-of-court settlements.83 It was originally estab-
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 40. 
 79. See generally George A. Bermann, U.S. Class Actions and the “Global Class,” 
19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91 (2009) for his discussion of the jurisdictional issues that 
are created by opt-in and opt-or mechanisms. See also Rachael Mulheron, The Case for 
an Opt-Out Class Action for European Member States, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409 (2009), 
in which she argues that an opt-out system is better suited for the jurisdictional situation 
among EU member states. 
 80. See, e.g., Mulheron, supra note 79, at 431–34. 
 81. EU Overview, supra note 47, at 41. 
 82. M.-J. van der Heijden, Class Actions/les actions collectives, 14 ELEC. J. COMP. L.,  
Dec. 2010, para. 4 (Neth.), available at http://www.ejcl.org/143/art143-18.pdf. 
 83. See Mulheron, supra note 79, at 425–26; see also Memorandum from Dr. I.M. 
Tzankova & D.F. Lunsingh Scheurleer, Tilburg Univ., to Prof. Deborah Hensler, Stan-
ford Law Sch. & Dr. Christopher Hodges, Univ. of Oxford, on Class Actions, Group 
Litigation and Other Forms of Collective Litigation Dutch Report 3 (Sept. 24, 2007), 
available at 
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lished for mass personal injury claims,84 but has been utilized to secure 
approval of several large securities fraud settlements.85 Given the sub-
stantive differences between these procedures, they will be discussed 
briefly in turn.86 
(1) Representative Group Actions 
The representative group action may be brought only by representative 
organizations, including investor or consumer organizations, special pur-
pose vehicles formed expressly to represent aggrieved parties, and by 
                                                                                                             
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Netherlands_Nation
al_Report.pdf. 
 84. The WCAM procedure was prompted by claims arising from the use of the drug 
diethylstilbestrol (DES) and was adopted in 2005. Harbour & Shelly, supra note 40, at 7. 
 85. See infra notes 101–20 and accompanying text. 
 86. Although Representative Group Actions and WCAM settlements are the proce-
dural mechanisms most frequently used for collective relief, a few variations and alterna-
tive mechanisms do exist. One variation of Representative Group Actions involves the 
assignment of a party’s individual claims to a legal foundation for a representative group. 
The representative group may then request monetary damages for the group on the basis 
of the individual claim; this is in addition to the injunctive or declaratory relief that may 
be achieved by the group action. Although this procedure seems to be a loophole on the 
ban on monetary damages, in reality the legal assignment of claims is burdensome and 
not practical. See Ianika Tzankova & Daan Lunsingh Scheurleer, Section Three: Western 
Europe: The Netherlands, 622 ANNALS 149, 151–52 (2009); see also Karen Jelsma & 
Manon Cordewener, The Settlement of Mass Claims: Hot Topic in the Netherlands, INT’L 
L.Q., Summer 2011, at 13. Another alternative is to pursue an action derived from a pro-
ceeding in the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals. The Enterprise 
Chamber is a specialized business court dealing primarily with issues of corporate gov-
ernance. Although not an “action,” an Enterprise Chamber proceeding uses the “right of 
inquiry” to conduct an investigation into the facts regarding the corporate conduct at 
issue. The inquiry proceeding is divided into two phases. First, they must determine 
whether there is a “well founded reason to investigate.” If one exists they will proceed to 
conducting an investigation into the conduct at issue. In the second phase, the court will 
determine if the conduct is improper, and if so may order them to cease, or pursue alter-
native conduct. Although the court will not address liability, the report findings on the 
corporate conduct may then be used as a springboard to induce settlements from alleged 
wrongdoers who believe the inquiry supports the finding that they are indeed liable. See 
Stephen Bainbridge, The Dutch Right of Inquiry, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE (July 13, 2009, 
4:59 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/07/the-
dutch-right-of-inquiry.html; see also [No. 82] The Purpose of the Right of Inquiry, 
THEDEFININGTENSION (July 13, 2009, 2:11 PM), 
http://www.thedefiningtension.com/2009/07/no-82-the-purpose-of-the-right-of-
inquiry.html [hereinafter DEFINING TENSION]. 
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public legal bodies.87 As previously observed, these actions can be 
brought solely for injunctive or declaratory relief—not for monetary 
damages—and they focus primarily on the alleged wrongful conduct of 
the defendant.88 Resultant judgments are binding solely on the repre-
sentative organization and the defendant.89 They are not binding on the 
individuals or entities purportedly represented or on nonrepresented par-
ties that have not opted-in to the proceeding.90 Once a favorable judg-
ment has been entered for the plaintiffs, the parties actually injured by 
the defendant’s conduct must then bring their own individual actions on 
the same grounds and must establish causation, liability, and damages. In 
other words, the group action is a “stepping stone” or springboard for 
subsequent individual actions for monetary compensation.91 Despite the 
existence of the debilitating factors previously addressed, the Dutch 
group action procedure was applied thirty-two times in the period 1994–
2007.92 The procedure is now being used by a special purpose vehicle 
formed solely to bring securities fraud claims against Fortis N.V., after a 
class action asserting similar claims was dismissed by a federal court in 
the United States.93 The plaintiff foundation, directed by a U.S. class ac-
tion lawyer, has indicated that its Dutch lawsuit is intended to provide a 
way around the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison.94 The U.S. law-
yers involved in the Fortis litigation seem poised to use the leverage of 
favorable declaratory relief to extract a large out-of-court settlement 
from the defendant, which could then be submitted for judicial approval 
and preclusion of further claims pursuant to the collective settlement 
procedure under WCAM.95 
                                                                                                             
 87. EU Overview, supra note 47, at 29–30; see also Deborah Hensler, The Future of 
Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 306, 311 (2011) [hereinafter Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation]. 
 88. Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class Actions and Interjurisdictional Preclu-
sion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 349–51 (2011). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. DEFINING TENSION, supra note 86, para. 2. 
 92. van der Heijden, supra note 82, at 4, para. 2.1. 
 93. In Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), the court 
applied the recent Supreme Court decision of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 
S. Ct. 2869 (2010) to find that the plaintiff class did not satisfy the “conducts” or “ef-
fects” test for the court to have jurisdiction over the case. The case was dismissed with 
prejudice. 
 94. Evan Weinberger, Fortis Dutch Fraud Suit Could Enable Non-US Claims, 
LAW360 (Jan. 10, 2011), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/219127/print?section=securities. 
 95. See generally Kevin LaCroix, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Pursue Non-U.S. Securities 
Litigation Alternatives After Morrison, D&O DIARY (Jan. 11, 2011), 
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(2) Collective Settlement Mass Damages Actions 
The WCAM statute permits a representative organization, whether 
preexisting or created solely for the purpose of the proceeding, together 
with the adverse party alleged as the wrongdoer, to jointly petition the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeals to approve an out-of-court settlement the 
parties have voluntarily negotiated.96 Most significantly, the WCAM 
statute makes judicial approval of the settlement binding on all class 
members who do not “opt-out” of the settlement.97 After the petition has 
been filed, notice of the proposed settlement must be provided to the des-
ignated members of the class.98 To secure approval of the settlement, the 
parties must satisfy the following criteria: 
(1) the compensation provided is not unreasonable, 
(2) the defendant’s performance is sufficiently guaranteed, 
(3) the representative organization adequately represents the class, and 
(4) the number of class members is sufficient to warrant certification.99 
If the court then approves the settlement, notice of that approved set-
tlement must be provided and class members are given a statutory mini-
mum of three months in which to exercise their rights to opt-out of the 
class and pursue their own individual actions.100 The opt-out feature pro-
vides significant settlement incentives to defendants who obviously pre-
fer their settlements of disputes to have preclusive, binding effect on both 
actual and potential claimants. 
The WCAM procedure has been used in a number of high-profile secu-
rities fraud cases, including the significant Shell Petroleum settlement on 
                                                                                                             
http://www.dandodiary.com/2011/01/articles/securities-litigation/plaintiffs-lawyers-
pursue-nonus-securities-litigation-alternatives-after-morrison/. 
 96. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation, supra note 87, at 311; Murtagh, supra 
note 24, at 37. 
 97. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation, supra note 87, at 311; Murtagh, supra 
note 24, at 37. 
 98. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation, supra note 87, at 311; Murtagh, supra 
note 24, at 37. 
 99. van der Heijden, supra note 82, at 8, para. 2.5.2. 
 100. Mulheron, supra note 79, at 425 n.94 (citing MARCO LOOS ET AL., CIVIC 
CONSULTING, EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF COLLECTIVE 
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final.pdf). 
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behalf of non-U.S. investors in 2009.101 The Shell Petroleum settlement 
was negotiated after class actions had been filed and consolidated in a 
U.S. federal court on behalf of United States and non-U.S. investors, al-
leging Shell had misrepresented its oil reserves. During the initial phase 
of the litigation, the court denied Shell’s motion to dismiss the non-U.S. 
claimants based on lack of jurisdiction, given that they were foreign in-
vestors making investments in a foreign company’s securities in foreign 
securities markets, the so-called “F-cubed” jurisdictional scenario later 
addressed in Morrison.102 Subsequently, and perhaps without full disclo-
sure to class counsel, the law firm for a Dutch pension fund that had filed 
an individual action against Shell on similar grounds, separately negoti-
ated a settlement with Shell on behalf of non-U.S. investors.103 Shell ad-
vised the federal court of the settlement and sought to dismiss the non-
U.S. claims. Class counsel sought to enjoin the settlement, mediation 
ensued, and ultimately, on a special master’s recommendation, the feder-
al court declined jurisdiction over the non-U.S. claims.104 Shell soon set-
tled with the U.S. investors for roughly $83 million.105 Then Shell, to-
gether with a special purpose foundation representing numerous institu-
tions and various shareholder organizations, a shareholders’ advocacy 
group, and two Dutch pension funds, successfully petitioned the Amster-
dam Court of Appeals to approve the settlement of the non-U.S. inves-
tors’ claims for roughly $354 million.106 The Dutch court’s approval of 
the settlement agreement purportedly resolved the claims of Dutch inves-
tors and all other non-U.S. investors, excluding only U.S. resident pur-
chasers of shares on U.S. exchanges.107 U.S. counsel that negotiated the 
Dutch settlement, apparently under contingency fee agreements with the 
Dutch pension funds, received fees totaling $47 million, while Shell 
                                                                                                             
 101. See Michael Goldhaber, ‘Shell Model’ Opens Door to European Class Actions, 
AM. LAW. (Jan. 7, 2008, 3:04 AM), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleFriendlyTAL.jsp?id=900005499991. 
 102. In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig. (Shell I), 380 F. Supp. 2d 509, 573 
(D.N.J. 2005). 
 103. See Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation, supra note 87, at 315–16. 
 104. In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig. (Shell II), 522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 724 
(D.N.J. 2007). 
 105. Press Release, Shell Worldwide, Shell Announces Settlement of Reserve-Related 
Claims with U.S. Investors (June 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.shell.com/home/content/media/news_and_media_releases/archive/2008/us_re
serves_settlement_06032008.html. 
 106. See Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation, supra note 87, at 317. 
 107. See id. The U.S. investors’ claims against Shell had already settled in the U.S. for 
$83 million. It was the exclusion of foreign investors from the American settlement that 
served as a springboard for the Dutch settlement proceedings. See id. 
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agreed to pay an additional $27 million to U.S. class counsel on top of 
the $33 million in fees and expenses already awarded in the settlement of 
the U.S. class action.108 The settlement agreement specifically provided 
that Shell would pay reasonable legal fees and expenses to counsel for 
shareholders and that these payments would not be deducted from the 
total settlement amount.109 Interestingly, local Dutch counsel for the 
foundation charged conventional hourly fees and expenses, while U.S. 
counsel were paid fees typical under contingency fee arrangements.110 
Apparently, in contrast to U.S. class action procedures, attorney fees in 
Dutch collective actions do not have to be approved by the court, but ra-
ther by the representative foundation.111 It is unclear how these U.S. law 
firms avoided the Dutch prohibition on contingency fees, although a 
plausible argument might be advanced that (1) they were not members of 
the Dutch bar and not subject to its code of professional responsibility, 
and (2) there was no contingency since substantive litigation was never 
filed in the Netherlands. 
In any event, the Shell case suggests “that the lawyers retained by the 
association representing the class need not be Dutch and may be paid 
according to the fee rules of another jurisdiction.”112 The case further 
intimates that U.S. class counsel, not attorneys from EU member states, 
will continue to animate, if not dominate, the WCAM procedure for ap-
proval of preclusive settlements in securities litigation. A U.S. securities 
class action lawyer, now directing the representative foundation in the 
Fortis case, stated that the Shell case demonstrates “that the Old World is 
not a toothless tiger anymore.”113 
The WCAM procedure has also been employed to secure approval of a 
settlement by Converium Holdings, AG, a Swiss company now owned 
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by the French company, SCOR.114 Following the filing of a securities 
fraud class action against it in the United States, Converium decided to 
settle the case. However, it moved to have non-U.S. investors excluded 
from the class on grounds that the company was pursuing a collective 
settlement with them in the Netherlands.115 The court agreed, concluding 
that the non-U.S. investors’ claims should be “rightfully resolved in the 
courts of another land.”116 Representative associations founded by SCOR 
represent the non-U.S. investors in the settlement, 97% of whom are not 
from the Netherlands.117 The settlement agreement provides for a total 
gross payment of $58 million, but this includes a 20% contingency fee 
for U.S. class counsel, amounting to almost $12 million, which was ap-
proved by the board of the representative foundation.118 Again, under 
WCAM, these attorney fees may not be subject to judicial approval, thus 
allowing U.S. firms to be paid fees on a basis prohibited by local law. 
The settlement agreement is widely expected to be approved by the Am-
sterdam Court of Appeals within the next several months.119 
Despite these noteworthy successes by U.S. class action counsel utiliz-
ing the WCAM procedures to achieve favorable settlements, many ques-
tion whether the Netherlands will emerge as a transatlantic “red-light 
district” for class actions.120 First, both the Shell and Converium proceed-
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ings to settle the claims of non-U.S. shareholders arose from pending 
U.S. securities class actions prior to the Court’s decision in Morrison. It 
is reasonable to doubt whether Shell or Converium would have vigorous-
ly pursued settlements with non-U.S. investors if those investors had no 
class action remedies in the United States and had to deal with daunting 
legal obstacles in the EU member states in filing individual or collective 
claims. Post-Morrison, it appears unlikely that companies accused of 
securities fraud will be inclined to reach massive settlements with U.S. 
class action law firms regarding claims of non-U.S. investors that can no 
longer be asserted in U.S. courts. 
Most would acknowledge the practical reality that once a European 
class complaint has been dismissed by U.S. courts, there is little chance, 
if any, that the foreign shareholders will ever initiate an action overseas. 
When plaintiffs have no access to U.S. courts, it is unlikely that foreign 
corporate defendants will be amendable to settlement with non-U.S. in-
vestors.121 One writer has noted that because WCAM does not provide an 
avenue for “representative or aggregate litigation, it cannot be used to 
compel an unwilling defendant to change its behavior (e.g., to reform the 
prison system) nor can the threat of a damages class action be used to 
induce the defendant to settle.”122 Similarly, another observed that with-
out access to U.S. courts for non-U.S. investors, it is unlikely that a claim 
will be initiated in Europe worth settling via WCAM, and, accordingly, 
the U.S. dismissal of non-U.S. investor claims under Morrison is really 
“tantamount to plaintiffs having no remedy at all.”123 
Moreover, courts in other jurisdictions, whose shareholders may have 
been purportedly denied their day in court by WCAM procedures, may 
conclude that the Amsterdam Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction-
al reach. There are major unresolved issues as to whether the Dutch 
court’s judgments will be recognized and enforced in EU member states 
or in jurisdictions outside the EU. As one scholar has noted, “the land-
scape for collateral review of such judgments remains . . . unchar-
tered.”124 The EU’s Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments125 does not specifically address the recogni-
tion of judicially approved collective settlements, much less those that 
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did not involve substantive pleadings or adjudications in any court.126 
The EU Regulation, however, does deny recognition and enforcement of 
judgments where it would be “manifestly contrary to public policy in the 
member state in which recognition is sought.”127 Clearly, the Dutch 
judgment binding parties who were not represented solely on the basis of 
their failure to take the initiative to opt-out raises significant policy con-
cerns, including constitutional restraints, among the numerous member 
states that require voluntary opt-in decisions by those who would be 
bound by legal judgments.128 At least one U.S. court has noted that the 
U.S. class action’s opt-out feature might violate French constitutional 
principles.129 Certainly, the questions of adequate representation by 
counsel, among others, provide substantive grounds for collateral attacks 
of court-approved mass settlements in the Netherlands. 
Lastly, it is at least curious that the Netherland’s WCAM procedure 
has been widely heralded by securities class action counsel as the “tiger” 
of European collective redress schemes.130 The inherent flaw in this 
claim is that the Dutch procedure simply cannot be classified as a “class 
action.” There may be a “class,” although most investors may not know 
they are in it, but there certainly is no “action.” The WCAM procedure 
might be better described as a glorified alternative dispute resolution 
technique, with a kicker that offers preclusion of claimants who fail to 
opt-out of the settlement. Moreover, no pending lawsuit is even required 
by the Dutch statute.131 While the act permits mass settlement of unfiled 
claims, it does not in any sense provide for class action litigation.132 An-
other scholar has described the procedure as “a composite of a voluntary 
settlement contract sealed with a ‘judicial trust mark.’”133 It has also been 
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referred to as “a back-end device without a front-end,” given that the 
Netherlands has not adopted a class action or collective redress scheme 
in which a class can pursue monetary damages.134 If WCAM is the best 
collective redress scheme currently on offer from the member states, one 
must ask whether a supranational scheme is likely to soon be on offer 
from the EU. 
VI. SUPRANATIONAL COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
A. Background 
The European Union, beginning with its 1992 initiatives to create a 
single securities market through a combination of minimum uniform 
standards and mutual recognition, has long sought to harmonize and 
strengthen the securities regulatory regimes of the member states.135 
While the European Commission has encouraged the development of 
competent regulatory authorities in all the member states and broader 
cooperation among those authorities, it has not extensively addressed 
issues of private enforcement through private individual or collective 
civil actions in member state courts to recover damages arising from se-
curities law violations. 
The European Commission has begun to address collective redress 
procedures in fields other than securities law. In 1998 the European 
Council of Ministers adopted a harmonizing directive in the consumer 
protection area directing the member states to enact national laws provid-
ing for minimum standards for group actions by “qualified entities,” such 
as consumer associations or public entities, for injunctive or declaratory 
relief.136 While mandating the development of injunctive and declaratory 
relief for violations of member state consumer protection laws, it did not 
provide those organizations with standing to sue for monetary damag-
es.137 Subsequently, the Council adopted a regulation on consumer pro-
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tection cooperation that substantially strengthened public enforcement, 
but again did not provide for monetary compensation to consumers.138 
Finally, in late 2008, the Commission, concerned that current laws did 
not allow large number of consumers affected by single violations of 
consumer protection laws to obtain monetary relief, published its Green 
Paper on Consumer Collective Redress addressing whether collective 
redress schemes might provide an appropriate solution.139 
The European Commission has extended its focus from consumer pro-
tection to encompass competition or antitrust law as well. It published its 
Green Paper on damages actions for breach of EU antitrust rules in 
2005,140 which emphasized the importance of private as well as public 
enforcement of competition law. Expressing concerns that the system for 
private enforcement was inadequate, it proposed consideration of collec-
tive redress schemes.141 In 2008, the Commission followed up on this 
initiative with publication for public consultation of its White Paper on 
damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules.142 In this report, the 
Commission concluded that competition law was an area where collec-
tive redress could enhance consumers’ access to justice.143 It recom-
mended EU legislation to establish an opt-in collective action that could 
be brought by public entities, consumer organizations, and trade associa-
tions to pursue damages claims on behalf of victims.144 
B. The European Commission’s Public Consultation on Collective Re-
dress 
The European Commission recently shifted its focus on sectoral areas 
like antitrust and consumer protection to a broader, horizontal approach 
to collective redress. In February 2011, the Commission launched for 
public consultation its working document, Towards a Coherent Europe-
an Approach to Collective Redress.145 The purpose of the consultation 
was to identify common legal principles on collective redress among the 
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member states.146 The consultation was designed to determine how those 
common principles could fit into the EU legal system and into the legal 
orders of the member states.147 The objective, according to the Commis-
sion, was “to ensure from the outset that any proposal in this field, while 
serving the purpose of ensuring a more effective enforcement of EU 
laws, fits well into the EU legal tradition and into the set of procedural 
remedies already available for the enforcement of EU law.”148 These 
common legal principles and the EU legal tradition certainly include, 
among others, those features previously identified as debilitative for 
U.S.-style class actions. Moreover, the Commission reiterated in its 
working document that “a system of collective redress that results in 
lengthy and costly litigation is neither in the interests of consumers nor 
business and should be avoided.”149 
The Commission’s working document sets forth in some detail its op-
position to most of the features that have long facilitated class actions in 
the United States. The Commission’s guidance in its public consultation 
document demonstrates rather dramatically that any collective redress 
scheme ultimately proposed must be modeled to avoid any close resem-
blance to the U.S.-style class action and the legal system in which it has 
flourished.150 The Commission, in the section of its working document 
entitled, Strong Safeguards against Claims Litigation, states as follows: 
Any European approach to collective redress (injunctive and/or com-
pensatory) would have to avoid from the outset the risk of abusive liti-
gation. Many stakeholders have expressed concern that they wish to 
avoid certain abuses that have occurred in the U.S. with its “class ac-
tions” system. This system contains strong economic incentives for par-
ties to bring a case to court even if, on the merits, it is not necessarily 
well founded. These incentives are the result of a combination of sever-
al factors, in particular, the availability of punitive damages, the ab-
sence of limitations as regards standing (virtually anybody can bring an 
action on behalf of an open class of injured parties), the possibility of 
contingency fees for attorneys and the wide-ranging discovery proce-
dure for procuring evidence. The Commission believes that these fea-
tures taken together increase the risk of abusive litigation to an extent 
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which is not compatible with the European legal tradition . . . . Any Eu-
ropean approach to collective redress (injunctive and/or compensatory) 
should not give any economic incentive to bring abusive claims. In ad-
dition, effective safeguards to avoid abusive collective actions should 
be defined. These should be inspired by the existing national judicial 
redress systems in the EU Member States. The existing national mech-
anisms show that various safeguards, or their combinations, can be 
used.151 
The Commission’s insistence on inclusion of its member states’ debili-
tative factors as safeguards against abuse creates what one noted scholar 
has characterized as “an inherent and inescapable problem—either the 
procedure does not work effectively, or it will produce abuse.”152 What 
Europeans see as abuses in the American system “are the intended con-
sequences of a policy of private enforcement based on a post facto deter-
rence policy.”153 In other words, if European safeguards are put in place, 
collective redress schemes in the EU are unlikely to provide any signifi-
cant degree of compensatory redress.154  Obviously, the Commission has 
not labeled all U.S.-style class actions as abusive, but it does suggest that 
the basic features of the U.S. litigation scheme are anathema to litigation 
in the member states of the EU. Not to unduly belabor the point, but it is 
critical to appreciate what the Commission believes are U.S. principles to 
be avoided in the development of collective redress schemes for the EU 
member states. Instead of an outright rejection of the U.S. class action 
model, the Commission rejects bedrock U.S. civil litigation principles 
that it believes have combined to result in abuse: 
(1) liberal standing requirements, 
(2) contingency fees, 
(3) the absence of the loser pays rule, 
(4) liberal discovery processes, and 
(5) the availability of punitive damages.155 
Presumably because juries largely play no role in European civil ac-
tions, the Commission had no basis for adding this feature as another 
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principle contributing to the abuse. In the evolutionary development of 
collective redress schemes, the U.S. class action and litigation rules have 
become “the model of what not to do.” The European Commission’s 
working document poses some thirty-four questions for public comment, 
including, among others, the following: 
(1) Should private redress be independent of, complementary to, or 
subsidiary to enforcement by governmental authorities?156 
(2) Should the scope of relief be extended from injunctive relief to 
monetary damages?157 
(3) Should proposals on collective redress be compliant with a set of 
common principles?158 
(4) Should ADR be promoted for resolution of multiple claims?159 
(5) Should prior efforts to resolve disputes through collective consen-
sual dispute resolution be a mandatory prerequisite to collective redress 
in the courts?160 
(6) Which safeguards should be considered particularly successful in 
limiting abusive litigation?161 
(7) Should “loser pays” principles be applied to injunctive or compen-
satory collective redress schemes?162 
(8) Who should be allowed to bring collective redress actions?163 
(9) Are non-public solutions like third party funding or legal costs in-
surance advisable in achieving the right balance between providing ac-
cess to justice and avoiding abuse?164 
(10) “Should the Commission’s work on compensatory collective re-
dress be extended to other areas of EU law besides competition and 
consumer protection,” e.g., financial services law or securities regula-
tion?165 
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The public consultation process, including the period for public re-
sponse to these questions, concluded on April 30, 2011.166 The European 
Commission received over 300 comments from various institutions, rep-
resenting the interests of consumers, businesses, lawyers, academia, and 
member state governments.167 In addition, it received almost 20,000 
comments from individuals.168 The author reviewed over 200 of the insti-
tutional responses and summarized his findings in Appendices 1 and 2 to 
this Article. The vast majority of the institutional responses rejects con-
tingency fees, supports the loser pays rule, objects to any liberalization of 
discovery, opposes punitive damages, and overwhelmingly favors opt-in 
versus opt-out class determination procedures. Although there is a sub-
stantial divergence of views regarding a requirement of mandatory prior 
submission of claims to some alternative dispute resolution mechanism, 
the responses strongly favor standing to bring collective redress actions 
for governmental entities. One can only conclude from these responses 
that the EU will find it politically impractical, if not impossible, to de-
velop a collective redress scheme that incorporates any of the features 
that facilitate U.S.-style class actions. Indeed, according to the European 
Federation of Investors, no consumer organization in the EU has ever 
asked for something “remotely resembling” the American class action.169 
Notably absent from the debate are the member states’ securities regu-
latory authorities, who seemingly have abstained from expressing any 
support for collective redress by governmental authorities, investor asso-
ciations, or individual victims of securities fraud. In addition, the Euro-
pean Securities Committee,170 created by the Commission in 2001 to ad-
vise on securities regulatory policies and legislation, and the European 
Securities Market Authority171 created by Council regulation in late 2010 
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to promote convergence among member state regulatory authorities and 
to facilitate stronger investor protection, have apparently been totally 
silent throughout the consultation process. 
Many of the institutional responses to the Commission’s public consul-
tation, in addition to expressing their loudly ringing endorsements of the 
debilitating factors previously discussed, also challenge the Commis-
sion’s authority to undertake any reform in the area of collective redress. 
For example, the Law Society of England and Wales has argued that 
principles of subsidiarity,172 essentially an EU states’ rights concept, 
foreclose the European Commission’s development of a “pan-European 
procedure for collective redress.”173 In its view, “it is neither appropriate 
nor proportionate to impose a new set of procedural rules, to be followed 
in all courts in all member states.”174 Instead, it suggested that the Com-
mission recommend minimum standards for the development of collec-
tive redress under national law and focus on the mutual recognition of 
judgments in collective actions.175 The European Banking Federation 
also expressed its doubts regarding the EU’s competence in establishing 
judicial procedures for collective redress in the member states,176 while 
also questioning the need for any EU initiative at all.177 Similarly, the Bar 
Council of England and Wales commented that the Commission is simp-
ly not empowered under the Treaty for European Union178 to engage in 
reform of the various member states’ collective redress schemes, whether 
related to the substance or procedure of those schemes.179 
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C. The Prospects for EU Reform 
The European Commission’s Justice Commissioner announced in a 
speech last July her intention to issue a communication by year-end 2011 
regarding the Commission’s further intentions regarding collective re-
dress.180 She identified three options that will be considered by the 
Commission. The first option is to terminate the Commission’s collective 
redress initiative on the basis that the arguments in favor of EU interac-
tion are “not compelling.”181 The second option is for the Commission to 
issue a Recommendation to the member states for their consideration in 
developing national collective redress schemes.182 The final option would 
be for the Commission to propose EU-level legislation for either a sec-
toral or horizontal collective redress scheme.183 She concluded by stating 
that “any initiative in this area would have to respect the legal traditions 
of the member states and will have to avoid abuses of the system which 
have occurred in other legal systems, such as the USA.”184 Her remarks 
certainly signal adherence to prohibitions on contingency fees, continua-
tion of the loser pays rule, limited discovery, restrictive standing re-
quirements, and rejection of punitive damages. 
The Justice Commissioner’s speech was followed several days later by 
a draft report issued by the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal 
Affairs, which set forth a motion for a European parliamentary resolution 
on collective redress. The proposed resolution, in its recitations, notes the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s “efforts” this year, through its Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes185 decision, “to limit frivolous litigation and the abuse of 
the U.S. class action system”; stresses that Europe must not introduce a 
U.S.-style class action or any system which would lend itself to similar 
abuse; commends member state efforts at collective redress litigation 
“while avoiding an abusive litigation culture;” and questions the Europe-
                                                                                                             
 180. Viviane Reding, Justice Comm’r, Eur. Comm’n, Speech before the European 
Parliament Legal Affairs [JURI] Committee: A horizontal instrument for collective re-
dress in Europe? (July 12, 2011) (Belg.), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/517&format=HT
ML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (plaintiffs, alleging sex 
discrimination based on a flawed corporate culture but not on specific employment prac-
tices, failed to demonstrate the requisite commonality of law and fact). See generally Jess 
Bravin & Ann Zimmerman, Justices Curb Class Actions: High Court Tosses Wal-Mart 
Bias Suit, Rules Plaintiffs Had Too Little in Common, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2011, at A1. 
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an Commission’s authority, under both subsidiarity principles186 and the 
European Union Treaty, to even consider collective redress measures.187 
The body of the draft parliamentary motion, among other provisions, 
underscores the necessity for the following required safeguards: 
(1) Standing must be restricted to representative organizations desig-
nated by the member states.188 
(2) The group members represented must be clearly identified before 
the claim is brought pursuant to opt-in procedures.189 
(3) An opt-out system must be rejected on the grounds that it is contra-
ry to many Member States’ constitutions and “violates the rights of any 
victim who might participate in the procedure unknowingly and yet 
would be bound by the court’s decision.”190 
(4) Victims must in all cases have the right to pursue individual com-
pensatory redress in the courts.191 
(5) Punitive damages must be prohibited.192 
(6) Compensation must be distributed to individual victims in propor-
tion to their individual harm.193 
(7) Contingency fees must be prohibited.194 
(8) Each claimant must provide evidence for his individual claim.195 
(9) Defendants must not be required to disclose documents to claim-
ants since discovery “is mostly unknown in Europe and must be reject-
ed at [the] European level.”196 
(10) There can be no action “without financial risk,” and “the unsuc-
cessful party must bear the costs of the other party.”197 
                                                                                                             
 186. Rapporteur on Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, 
Draft Rep. on a Motion for a European Parliament Resolution, Comm. on Leg. Affairs, 
Doc. 2011/2089(INI), at 4 (July 15, 2011) (by Klaus-Heiner Lehne) [hereinafter Draft 
Rep. on a Motion for a Eur. Parliament Resolution]. 
 187. See id. at 8 (referring specifically to Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 10. 
 190. Id. at 6. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
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(11) The Commission must not set any conditions on funding of claims, 
since “it is mostly unknown in Member States’ legal systems to seek 
third-party funding, for instance, by offering a share of the damages 
awarded.”198 
These safeguards, as delineated in the draft motion, seem not only to 
sound the death knell for the development of European class actions, but 
to almost any meaningful form of collective redress not funded entirely 
by member state governments. Assuming some form of collective redress 
mechanism is established, the motion further calls for a legal obligation 
of the parties to first seek a collective consensual resolution through al-
ternative dispute resolution prior to filing collective court proceedings.199 
The report’s draft parliamentary motion is followed by the Rappor-
teur’s Explanatory Statement that even more strongly adheres to the de-
bilitating features of European legal traditions. He questions the need for 
any EU action in the field, citing negative responses to the Commission’s 
public consultation by the governments of France and Germany.200 The 
Rapporteur then asserts strongly that public enforcement of EU and na-
tional laws must be predominant, given investigative authority that “can-
not be made available to private parties,” and that private enforcement 
should continue to be solely “complementary.”201 He even suggests that 
any collective redress scheme proposed be limited to claimants who have 
suffered losses of €2,000 or less.202 The Rapporteur insists on the loser 
pays rule, prohibitions on contingency fees and punitive damages, the 
rejection of third-party funding, and no discovery rights.203 He states that 
“a defendant cannot be required to provide evidence for the claimant,”204 
that “it is of decisive importance that collective claimants should not be 
in a better position than individual claimants when it comes to evi-
dence,”205 and that “disclosure requirements unnecessarily raise the cost 
of litigation and encourage unmeritorious claims and must therefore be 
rejected at the European level.”206 He also slams opt-out provisions as 
violative of both the constitutions of certain member states and as prob-
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lematic under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights,207 
which provides that “everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by 
impartial tribunals.”208 Although this draft motion and explanatory 
statement do not yet constitute the official views of the European Com-
mission, the policies expressed may well signal the end for now of any 
progress toward an effective U.S.-style class action for aggrieved inves-
tors. From the European perspective, American class actions remain “the 
poster children of the ‘American litigation disease.’”209 
European hostility not only to the U.S.-style class action, but also to 
virtually the entire panoply of private litigation standards in the United 
States, works a formidable impasse to aggrieved investors seeking re-
dress as victims of securities fraud. In situations where an entire class of 
a particular company’s individual securities investors have been defraud-
ed, important questions exist as to whether such investors would have 
effective private access to justice in the EU’s member states. To the ex-
tent the European Commission determines that lack of access raises seri-
ous EU-wide public policy concerns, it should strongly consider devel-
opment of a publicly-administered collective redress scheme. For exam-
ple, the Commission could direct member states to grant standing either 
to a competent governmental authority or to a government-funded inde-
pendent ombudsman to assert claims on behalf of aggrieved classes of 
investors. These authorities, in addition to public funding, should be 
granted broad governmental investigatory power and given the compe-
tence to pursue monetary recoveries and to establish common funds for 
distribution to investors. In its development of a publicly funded collec-
tive redress authority, the Commission might look to the “fair funds” 
provisions of the United States’ Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.210 Those 
provisions, in effect, have established a publicly-administered collective 
redress scheme for aggrieved securities investors in the United States. 
These fair funds provisions empower the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) to impose and collect monetary penalties against 
companies that have violated the securities laws and authorize the SEC 
to distribute those penalties to investors who were harmed by those vio-
lations.211 The SEC’s imposition of penalties and development of distri-
                                                                                                             
 207. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms [ECHR] art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 208. Draft Rep. on a Motion for a Eur. Parliament Resolution, supra note 186, at 13. 
 209. Harbour & Shelley, supra note 40, at 33. 
 210. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006). 
 211. Id. 
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bution plans, while subject to a “fair and reasonable” standard,212 often 
serve to protect investors by both deterrence of fraudulent conduct and 
compensation of defrauded investors.213 The European Commission 
should consider this model, as opposed to the U.S.-style class action 
model it abhors, as a platform for constructing a collective redress 
scheme that pursues monetary recoveries, whether in the form of civil 
penalties, actual damages or both, on behalf of investors. As the Com-
mission continues to integrate its financial markets and the regulatory 
scheme governing those markets, it should view development of a pub-
licly-administered collective redress scheme as an integral part of its 
work by ensuring increased deterrence against securities violations and 
increased access to monetary recoveries for investors. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article addresses the major factors in the U.S. litigation system 
that have developed and nurtured the private class action for investors 
victimized by securities fraud. The author discusses the negating corol-
laries of those factors in the EU’s member states, both those that are 
common to civil litigation in Europe generally and those that have been 
added as specific features of the EU member states’ various collective 
redress schemes. No effective scheme has yet been enacted by any mem-
ber state, and the one most frequently lauded, the Netherlands’ WCAM 
procedure, does not provide a mechanism for class recovery of monetary 
damages, but only a mechanism for securing court approval of voluntary 
out-of-court settlements of class claims. 
                                                                                                             
 212. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 CIV. 4963, 2004 WL 1621185, at * 1 
(S.D.N.Y July 20, 2004) aff’d sub nom. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 
WorldCom, Inc., v. S.E.C., 467 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 213. Incidental to their respective WCAM proceedings, Royal Dutch Shell and Zurich 
Financial Services separately agreed to pay massive penalties into SEC Fair Funds to be 
redistributed to harmed investors. Claims Fund: Zurich Financial Services, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 14, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/claims/zurichfinserv.htm. Zurich Financial, for 
their role in the Converium Holding scandal, paid a $1 disgorgement and a $25 million 
penalty to the SEC. Id. Prior to Fair Funds, only the $1 disgorgement could be redistrib-
uted to injured shareholders. Id. Due to the Fair Funds provision of Sarbanes-Oxley, the 
entire Zurich payment of $25,000,001 was redistributed. Id. Royal Dutch Shell agreed to 
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reserves. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces $113.5 Million Distri-
bution in Royal Dutch Shell Fair Fund (Apr. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-67.htm. Interestingly, the Fair Fund distribu-
tion was allocated to over 84,000 investors living in 56 countries. Id. Had some of those 
investors been f-cubed claims, questions might be raised regarding the international dis-
persal of Fair Funds in the post-Morrison world. 
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Moreover, the European Commission, in its efforts toward the devel-
opment of more efficient collective redress schemes, whether for hori-
zontal application or for specific application to securities fraud, has not 
demonstrated any enthusiasm for class-based private remedies. Indeed, 
its own guidance suggests abhorrence of the U.S.-style class action. The 
institutional responses to the Commission’s recent public consultation 
evidence overwhelming opposition. Furthermore, securities regulatory 
authorities both at the EU and member state levels apparently have been 
silent throughout the consultation process. When those charged with pub-
lic enforcement of the securities laws, presumably the regulatory zealots, 
have been unsupportive of stronger private remedies to supplement their 
work, the alarm bells of prospective failure ring loudly. Perhaps the best 
outcome would be an EU directive that each member state grant standing 
to a competent governmental authority, or, in the case of group actions 
against a government itself, independent ombudsmen to pursue claims on 
behalf of aggrieved investors, supported by public funds and facilitated 
by governmental investigatory power, to pursue recoveries and establish 
common funds for distribution to aggrieved investors. Even this, for 
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Appendix 1—Responses to the EU Public Consultation: Towards a Co-
herent European Approach to Collective Redress 
The data below is representative of the responses to the EU Public 
Consultation Towards a Coherent European Approach Toward Collec-
tive Redress.214 Only responses by organizations registered in the EU’s 
Interest Representative Register were included. The statistics display EU 




Percentage of Public Consultation 
Responses 
Issue Support % Oppose % 
Contingency Fees 8.2 91.8 
Loser Pays Rule 93.3 6.7 
Liberal Discovery Procedures 7.6 92.4 
Punitive Damages 4.5 95.5 
Opt-In 79.3 20.7 
Opt-Out 20.7 79.3 
Mandatory Pre-Litigation ADR 19.8 80.2 
 
Notes: 
Results reflect 225 responses sampled. Excluded from the data are re-
sponses by individuals, responses by organizations or authorities located 
in non-EU member states, and responses that do not expressly opine on 
any of the issues studied (“maybe” responses not included). 
Although many responses did not support an EU collective redress 
mechanism, they provided their opinions about the ideal makeup of an 
EU system if it were to happen. These responses were included in the 
above data. 
The percentages for each issue do not include responses that did not 
address the specific issue. For example, out of ten responses, if five re-
sponses supported an issue, and three were against the issue, the percent-
ages were determined using a denominator of eight, instead of ten. 
                                                                                                             
 214. Public Consultation, supra note 167. 
 215. Data compilation on file with the author. 
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Appendix 2—Official Government Responses by EU Member-States 
This data set displays the official attitudes taken by various EU mem-
ber states on the various issues related to the EU Public Consultation: 




















Austria —* Support — — In Voluntary 
Bulgaria Support Oppose Oppose Support — Voluntary 
Czech 
Republic Oppose Support — Oppose In Voluntary 
France Oppose Support Oppose Oppose In Voluntary 
Germany Oppose Support — Oppose In Voluntary 
Greece Oppose Support Oppose Oppose In Voluntary 
Hungary Oppose — Oppose Oppose — — 
Italy — Support — Oppose In Voluntary 
Nether-
lands Oppose Support Oppose Oppose Out Voluntary 
Latvia Oppose Support Oppose Oppose In Mandatory 
Poland Oppose Support Oppose — In Voluntary 
Portugal — Support Support Oppose Out Voluntary 
Sweden Oppose Support — Oppose In — 
U.K. Oppose Support — — Out Mandatory 
 
Notes: 
Only responses provided by federal ministerial agencies were included 
in the data set. Responses by nongovernmental, nonprofit, or statutorily 
independent agencies were excluded. European Consumer Centre re-
sponses were also excluded. 
The * denotes that the member state did not expressly opine on the 
specific issue. Conditional or non-conclusive discussion of an issue is 
likewise indicated by the symbol. 
                                                                                                             
 216. Public Consultation, supra note 167; Data set on file with the author. 
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Fourteen of the twenty-seven EU member states are represented in the 
data. The majority of these responses were provided by a member state’s 
Ministry of Justice. 
 
